Download This PaperMonotonicity in Ultimatum Bargaining
40 Pages Posted: 12 May 2023
Abstract
We study ultimatum bargaining games with asymmetric information regarding disagreement payoffs. Results from Mensch (2020) are used to find conditions under which a monotonic equilibrium exists in these games. A standard single crossing assumption implies the existence of a monotonic Nash equilibrium. Stronger assumptions are required for the existence of a monotonic Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. JEL Classification Numbers: C62, C72, C78, D82
Keywords: Games of Incomplete Information, Dynamic Bayesian Games, Pure Strategy Equilibrium, Single Crossing Property, bargaining, Ultimatum Game
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Robles, Jack, Monotonicity in Ultimatum Bargaining. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4446440 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4446440
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