The External Value of Internal Employee Responsiveness: Evidence from the Field

129 Pages Posted: 15 May 2023 Last revised: 2 Dec 2024

See all articles by Wei Cai

Wei Cai

Columbia Business School

Dennis Campbell

Harvard University - Accounting & Control Unit

Jiehang Yu

Columbia University - Columbia Business School

Date Written: April 28, 2023

Abstract

Internal coordination patterns among employees are often externally visible and may serve as signals of quality enabling the formation of trust between the firm and its external stakeholders. We focus on inter-employee responsiveness, or the responsiveness of employees to each other, as a particularly important, quantifiable, and objective aspect of internal coordination. Leveraging proprietary data from one company with exogenous assignment of employees to teams that serve individual customers, we examine the effect of inter-employee responsiveness on customer trust.  Each customer is served in an app-based group chat by a randomly assigned team of employees, and our data contains more than 2 million group chat messages with over 16 thousand customers. We find that inter-employee responsiveness serves as a credible signal in gaining customers’ trust as evidenced by their future contracting choices. The effect is more pronounced when the signals are 1) more frequent and 2) more intense. The results are robust to controlling various confounding factors and using alternative measures of customer trust. Our findings provide important implications for the value of internal employee responsiveness as a potential signal for building trust with external stakeholders.

Keywords: internal coordination, employee responsiveness, customer trust, signaling

Suggested Citation

Cai, Wei and Campbell, Dennis and Yu, Jiehang, The External Value of Internal Employee Responsiveness: Evidence from the Field (April 28, 2023). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4447603 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4447603

Wei Cai (Contact Author)

Columbia Business School ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

Dennis Campbell

Harvard University - Accounting & Control Unit ( email )

Soldiers Field
Boston, MA 02163
United States

Jiehang Yu

Columbia University - Columbia Business School ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

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