Agency Objectives, Organizational Change, and Optimizing Enforcement

Abstract

Effective antitrust relies on its institutions. We offer a brief retrospective of sudden and significant change at one of the antitrust institutions in the United States – the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) under the Biden administration. Changes under Chair Lina Khan have been more dramatic than at any time since the 1981 tenure of Chair James Miller. Much like Miller, changes in the agency have been fast and far reaching. Perhaps different than the Miller revolution has been a difference between rhetoric and reality on substance, as well as more significant disregard for transparency and managerial issues that reduce informed decision-making. Some of the managerial problems have improved over time, but a number of these issues remain significant. Overall, our view is that effective enforcement requires solving a series of principle agent problems internally as well as reducing regulatory uncertainty when such uncertainty could chill pro-competitive behavior and innovation.

Keywords: Antitrust, FTC, competition policy

JEL Classification: K21, L40