Free to Fail? Paternalistic Preferences in the United States

51 Pages Posted: 23 May 2023 Last revised: 6 Dec 2024

See all articles by Björn Bartling

Björn Bartling

University of Zurich - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Alexander W. Cappelen

NHH Norwegian School of Economics - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Henning Hermes

HHU Düsseldorf

Marit Skivenes

University of Bergen - Department of Administration and Organization Theory

Bertil Tungodden

NHH Norwegian School of Economics - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 4 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 06, 2024

Abstract

This paper examines paternalistic preferences in large-scale experiments in the U.S. Participants decide whether to intervene to prevent a stakeholder, mistaken about their options, to make a choice that is misaligned with their preferences. We find that the willingness to intervene strongly depends on the nature of the paternalistic intervention: only a minority implements a hard intervention that limits the freedom to choose, while a majority implements a soft intervention that provides information without restricting the choice set. Based on a theoretical framework, we estimate that about half of the participants are welfarists, while a third are libertarian paternalists.

Keywords: paternalism, libertarian paternalism, welfarism, freedom to choose

JEL Classification: C91, C93, D69, D91

Suggested Citation

Bartling, Björn and Cappelen, Alexander W. and Hermes, Henning and Skivenes, Marit and Tungodden, Bertil, Free to Fail? Paternalistic Preferences in the United States (December 06, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4449814 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4449814

Björn Bartling (Contact Author)

University of Zurich - Department of Economics ( email )

Zuerich, 8006
Switzerland

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Alexander W. Cappelen

NHH Norwegian School of Economics - Department of Economics ( email )

Helleveien 30
N-5035 Bergen
Norway

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Henning Hermes

HHU Düsseldorf ( email )

Marit Skivenes

University of Bergen - Department of Administration and Organization Theory

Norway

Bertil Tungodden

NHH Norwegian School of Economics - Department of Economics ( email )

Helleveien 30
N-5035 Bergen
Norway

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
219
Abstract Views
1,208
Rank
148,530
PlumX Metrics