Capital Controls, Corporate Debt and Real Effects: Evidence from Boom and Crisis Times

99 Pages Posted: 31 May 2023

See all articles by Andrea Fabiani

Andrea Fabiani

Bank of Italy

Martha Lopéz Piñeros

Central Bank of Colombia

José-Luis Peydró

Imperial College London; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Universitat Pompeu Fabra (UPF) - Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences

Paul E. Soto

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Date Written: May 25, 2023

Abstract

We show that capital controls (CC), by slowing-down firm debt-growth in the boom, improve firm performance during crises. Exploiting a tax on foreign-currency (FX) debt inflows in Colombia before the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and multiple firm-level and loan-level administrative datasets, we find that CC reduce FX-debt inflows. Firms with weaker local banking relationships cannot fully substitute FX-debt with domestic-debt, thereby reducing firm-level total debt and imports during the boom. However, by preemptively reducing firm-level debt, CC boost exports and employment during the subsequent GFC, especially for financially-constrained firms. Moreover, CC do not significantly alter credit allocation between productive and unproductive firms.

Keywords: capital controls, firm FX-debt, real effects, macroprudential policy, capital inflows, crises.

JEL Classification: E58, F34, F38, G01, G21.

Suggested Citation

Fabiani, Andrea and Lopéz Piñeros, Martha and Peydro, Jose-Luis and Soto, Paul E., Capital Controls, Corporate Debt and Real Effects: Evidence from Boom and Crisis Times (May 25, 2023). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4458997 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4458997

Andrea Fabiani (Contact Author)

Bank of Italy ( email )

Via Nazionale 91
Rome, 00184
Italy

Martha Lopéz Piñeros

Central Bank of Colombia ( email )

Carrera 7 No. 14-78 Piso 11
Bogotá
Colombia

Jose-Luis Peydro

Imperial College London ( email )

South Kensington Campus
Exhibition Road
London, Greater London SW7 2AZ
United Kingdom

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Universitat Pompeu Fabra (UPF) - Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
Barcelona, Barcelona 08005
Spain
(+34) 93 542 1756 (Phone)
(+34) 93 542 1746 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/joseluispeydroswebpage/

Paul E. Soto

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ( email )

20th Street and Constitution Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20551
United States

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