Political Influence and Dark Money

38 Pages Posted: 9 Jun 2023 Last revised: 22 Nov 2023

See all articles by Keith E. Schnakenberg

Keith E. Schnakenberg

Washington University in St. Louis - Department of Political Science

Ian R. Turner

Yale University

Date Written: November 17, 2023

Abstract

We study the consequences of campaign finance disclosure laws in a model of informative campaign finance. Campaign spending can affect electoral outcomes and also signal policy information to politicians. Under mandatory disclosure donors may engage in spending that runs counter to their electoral interests in order to signal good news regarding their preferred policy. When donors can use dark money the electoral price to influence policy increases to account for the possibility that donors use public spending to signal, but secretly offset the electoral costs with dark money. Our results suggest that observable spending will tend to increase for moderate candidates and decrease for extreme candidates when dark money is allowed. We also illustrate how different social pressures affect patterns of campaign spending.

Keywords: Campaign finance; Dark money; Politician learning; Political economy

Suggested Citation

Schnakenberg, Keith E. and Turner, Ian R., Political Influence and Dark Money (November 17, 2023). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4461517 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4461517

Keith E. Schnakenberg

Washington University in St. Louis - Department of Political Science ( email )

One Brookings Drive
One Brookings Drive
St. Louis, MO 63130
United States

Ian R. Turner (Contact Author)

Yale University ( email )

115 Prospect Street
New Haven, CT 06511
United States

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