Even Lawyers Don't Like Legalese

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 120 (23), e2302672120 (2023)

7 Pages Posted: 5 Jun 2023

See all articles by Eric Martínez

Eric Martínez

University of Chicago Law School; Institute for Law & AI

Frank Mollica

University of Edinburgh

Edward Gibson

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)

Date Written: May 29, 2023

Abstract

Across modern civilization, societal norms and rules are established and communicated largely in the form of written laws. Despite their prevalence and importance, legal documents have long been widely acknowledged to be difficult to understand by those who are required to comply with them (i.e. everyone). Why? Across two pre-registered experiments, we evaluated five hypotheses for why lawyers write in a complex manner. Experiment 1 revealed that lawyers, like laypeople, were less able to recall and comprehend legal content drafted in a complex “legalese” register than content of equivalent meaning drafted in a simplified register. Experiment 2 revealed that lawyers rated simplified contracts as equally enforceable as legalese contracts, and rated simplified contracts as preferable to legalese contracts on several dimensions–including overall quality, appropriateness of style, and likelihood of being signed by a client. These results suggest that lawyers who write in a convoluted manner do so as a matter of convenience and tradition as opposed to an outright preference, and that simplifying legal documents would be both tractable and beneficial for lawyers and non-lawyers alike.

Keywords: law, language, psycholinguistics, curse of knowledge, experimental jurisprudence

JEL Classification: K10,K12,K30,K40,K49

Suggested Citation

Martínez, Eric and Mollica, Francis and Gibson, Edward, Even Lawyers Don't Like Legalese (May 29, 2023). Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 120 (23), e2302672120 (2023), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4462766 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4462766

Eric Martínez (Contact Author)

University of Chicago Law School ( email )

1111 E 60th St
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

Institute for Law & AI ( email )

Francis Mollica

University of Edinburgh ( email )

Old College
South Bridge
Edinburgh, Scotland EH8 9JY
United Kingdom

Edward Gibson

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) ( email )

77 Massachusetts Avenue
50 Memorial Drive
Cambridge, MA 02139-4307
United States

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