Working Remotely? Selection, Treatment, and the Market for Remote Work

97 Pages Posted: 1 Jun 2023

See all articles by Natalia Emanuel

Natalia Emanuel

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Emma Harrington

University of Virginia - Department of Economics

Date Written: May 1, 2023

Abstract

How does remote work affect productivity and how productive are workers who choose remote jobs? We estimate both effects in a U.S. Fortune 500 firm’s call centers that employed both remote and on-site workers in the same jobs. Prior to COVID-19, remote workers answered 12 percent fewer calls per hour than on-site workers. When the call centers closed due to COVID-19, the productivity of formerly on-site workers declined by 4 percent relative to already-remote workers, indicating that a third of the initial gap was due to a negative treatment effect of remote work. Yet an 8 percent productivity gap persisted, indicating that the majority of the productivity gap was due to negative worker selection into remote work. Difference-in-differences designs also indicate that remote work degraded call quality— particularly for inexperienced workers—and reduced workers’ promotion rates. In a model of the market provision of remote work, we find that firms were in a prisoner’s dilemma: all firms would have gained from offering comparable remote and on-site jobs, but any individual firm was loathe to attract less productive workers.

Keywords: remote work, work-from-home, worker productivity, selection

JEL Classification: J24, L23, L84, M54

Suggested Citation

Emanuel, Natalia and Harrington, Emma, Working Remotely? Selection, Treatment, and the Market for Remote Work (May 1, 2023). FRB of New York Staff Report No. 1061, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4466130 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4466130

Natalia Emanuel (Contact Author)

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of New York ( email )

33 Liberty Street
New York, NY 10045
United States

Emma Harrington

University of Virginia - Department of Economics ( email )

237 Monroe Hall
P.O. Box 400182
Charlottesville, VA 22904-418
United States

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