How the Rules of Coalition Formation Affect Stability of International Environmental Agreements

26 Pages Posted: 20 Sep 2003

See all articles by Michael Finus

Michael Finus

University of Stirling

Bianca Rundshagen

University of Hagen

Date Written: June 2003

Abstract

This paper compares stability of international environmental agreements for six different rules of coalition formation under very general conditions (any type of heterogeneity between countries). The rules can be interpreted as different institutional settings in which treaty formations take place and/or different designs of agreements. We consider open and restricted open membership game as well as four exclusive membership games with different degrees of unanimity required to form coalitions. From a policy perspective, counterintuitively, it turns out that stability is higher under exclusive than under open membership and stability increases with the degree of unanimity. We discuss the policy implications of our result for future treaty-making.

Keywords: Non-cooperative game theory, Rules of coalition formation, Stability

JEL Classification: C72, H41, Q20

Suggested Citation

Finus, Michael and Rundshagen, Bianca, How the Rules of Coalition Formation Affect Stability of International Environmental Agreements (June 2003). FEEM Working Paper No. 62.2003. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=447480 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.447480

Michael Finus (Contact Author)

University of Stirling ( email )

Stirling, Scotland FK9 4LA
United Kingdom

Bianca Rundshagen

University of Hagen ( email )

Profilstr. 8
Hagen, D-58084
Germany

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