Effect of Financial Incentives on Hospital-Cardiologist Integration and Cardiac Test Location

20 Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 570 (2023)

53 Pages Posted: 27 Jun 2023 Last revised: 10 Aug 2023

See all articles by Andy Yuan

Andy Yuan

Northwestern University - Pritzker School of Law

Bernard S. Black

Northwestern University - Pritzker School of Law; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Timea Viragh

Northwestern University - School of Education and Social Policy, Students

David Magid

University of Colorado at Denver - Colorado School of Public Health; Colorado Permanente Medical Group

Qian (Eric) Luo

Fitzhugh Mullan Institute for Health Workforce Equity, The George Washington University

Ali Moghtaderi

The George Washington University

Date Written: June 15, 2023

Abstract

Starting around 2006, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) progressively reduced Medicare fee-for-service (M-FFS) payments for the principal noninvasive cardiac tests, when performed in a cardiologist office (Office), yet kept payments flat to increasing for the same tests, performed in the hospital-based outpatient (HBO) setting. This produced a growing gap between HBO and Office payments for the same tests, and thus an incentive for hospitals to acquire cardiology practices in order to move cardiac tests to the HBO location and capture the HBO/Office payment differential. We use difference-in-differences analysis, in which we compare national M-FFS trends in cardiac test location to those for a control group of several large, integrated Medicare Advantage (M-Adv) health systems over 2005-2015, which were not affected by these reimbursement changes, and provide evidence that these reimbursement changes led to a large shift in testing from Office to HBO. This shift was concurrent with a sharp rise in hospital-cardiologist integration. The rise in integration and the proportion of testing in HBO varied greatly across states. Independent practice remains viable in very large states, but is endangered in many states, and is all but extinct in a growing number of states.

You can find the appendix of this paper at http://ssrn.com/abstract=4479499

Note:
Funding Information: The National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute provided funding for this project (5 R01 HL113550 and 5 RO1 HL153154).

Declaration of Interests: None.

Keywords: Cardiac Test, Financial Incentive, Cardiologists' Integration, Health Policy

JEL Classification: I11, I12, I13

Suggested Citation

Yuan, Ye and Black, Bernard S. and Viragh, Timea and Magid, David and Luo, Qian and Moghtaderi, Ali, Effect of Financial Incentives on Hospital-Cardiologist Integration and Cardiac Test Location (June 15, 2023). 20 Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 570 (2023), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4479497

Ye Yuan (Contact Author)

Northwestern University - Pritzker School of Law ( email )

375 E. Chicago Ave
Chicago, IL 60611
United States

Bernard S. Black

Northwestern University - Pritzker School of Law ( email )

375 E. Chicago Ave
Chicago, IL 60611
United States
312-503-2784 (Phone)

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Brussels
Belgium

Timea Viragh

Northwestern University - School of Education and Social Policy, Students ( email )

Evanston, IL
United States

David Magid

University of Colorado at Denver - Colorado School of Public Health ( email )

13001 E. 17th Place
Denver, CO
United States

Colorado Permanente Medical Group ( email )

Denver, CO
United States

Qian Luo

Fitzhugh Mullan Institute for Health Workforce Equity, The George Washington University ( email )

2175 K St NW
Washington, DC 20052
United States

Ali Moghtaderi

The George Washington University ( email )

950 New Hampshire Ave NW
Suite 609
Washington, DC 20052
United States

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