The Emperor’s Tael: Government Commitment Failure and Tax Revolts in Qing China, 1644–1912

30 Pages Posted: 25 Jun 2023

See all articles by Shuo Chen

Shuo Chen

Fudan University - Department of Economics

Xinyu Fan

Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business

Yu Hao

Peking University - School of Economics

Date Written: June 19, 2023

Abstract

Scholars have recognized that strengthening the state's fiscal capacity is a prerequisite for long-term economic development. However, a nationwide fiscal centralization reform by the Qing government (1723-1735) failed to achieve this goal. Instead, we find that the centralization reform surprisingly led to more tax revolts. More revolts were observed in areas where the central government reneged on its promise to compensate local governments for reform-related losses in recent years. Moreover, we find no increase in the provision of public goods post-reform. We thus highlight that a fiscal centralization reform can only succeed with credible commitments from the central government.

Keywords: Fiscal Centralization, Tax Revolt, Credible Commitments, Limited Government

JEL Classification: N15; N45; H77

Suggested Citation

Chen, Shuo and Fan, Xinyu and Hao, Yu, The Emperor’s Tael: Government Commitment Failure and Tax Revolts in Qing China, 1644–1912 (June 19, 2023). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4483809 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4483809

Shuo Chen

Fudan University - Department of Economics ( email )

600 GuoQuan Road
Yangpu District
Shanghai, 200433
China

Xinyu Fan (Contact Author)

Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business

E3, Oriental Plaza
1 East Chang An Ave
Beijing, Beijing 100006
China

Yu Hao

Peking University - School of Economics ( email )

Yiheyuan Road
the school of economics builiding
Beijing, 000000
China

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