Healthcare Administrative Costs and Competition Policy

Competition Policy International Antitrust Chronicle, (May 2023)

Duke Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Series No. 2023-36

7 Pages Posted: 5 Jul 2023

See all articles by Barak D. Richman

Barak D. Richman

Duke University School of Law; CERC, Stanford Univ. School of Medicine; George Washington University - Law School

Kevin Schulman

Stanford University

Date Written: May 2023

Abstract

Even though the U.S. healthcare system exhibits higher administrative costs than any other OECD nation, they have not received substantial attention from policymakers despite their enormous cost and impact on the market. We argue that competition policy could meaningfully reduce these administrative costs. We first describe how efforts to deploy electronic health records departed from pro-competition principles by failing to understand how healthcare firms would direct business processes exploit their incumbent positions in the market. We then argue that there is an urgent need to reduce costs and increase competition by standardizing and digitizing business processes across the health sector. High administrative costs in the health sector is not an inevitable consequence of a private payer system. To the contrary, it is a product of poorly conceived policies and a lack of competition and innovation.

Suggested Citation

Richman, Barak D. and Schulman, Kevin, Healthcare Administrative Costs and Competition Policy (May 2023). Competition Policy International Antitrust Chronicle, (May 2023), Duke Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Series No. 2023-36, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4488625

Barak D. Richman (Contact Author)

Duke University School of Law ( email )

210 Science Drive
Box 90362
Durham, NC 27708
United States
919-613-7244 (Phone)
919-613-7231 (Fax)

CERC, Stanford Univ. School of Medicine ( email )

United States

George Washington University - Law School ( email )

2000 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20052
United States

Kevin Schulman

Stanford University

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
73
Abstract Views
256
Rank
585,302
PlumX Metrics