Why Stop Grazing the Climate Commons?

Michigan Journal of Environmental and Administrative Law, Forthcoming

University of Utah College of Law Research Paper No. 556

50 Pages Posted: 26 Jun 2023 Last revised: 23 Aug 2023

See all articles by Brigham Daniels

Brigham Daniels

University of Utah College of Law

Date Written: June 23, 2023

Abstract

Many have argued that climate change is the textbook example of a tragedy of the commons. Assuming that is correct, to make headway on climate change, we would expect an enforceable agreement that provides for global collective action. The tragedy of the commons assumes that those who cut back when others do not are—to use the formal language of game theorists—suckers. So, the last thing we would expect is a surge of unilateral action. Contrary to theory, for the past decade, unilateral climate action has flourished among governments, businesses, other organizations, and individuals.

Is the number of climate suckers growing exponentially, or is there more going on? This Article proposes an alternative explanation. A growing and substantial part of the climate crisis is not subject to the tragedy of the commons, allowing rational actors to take climate action because of their self-interests, not despite them.

While the ability to rely on unilateral action to make some climate progress unlocks exciting possibilities, effectively confronting climate change requires a better understanding of why unilateral actors act. This Article exposes the economic and political incentives that frequently drive unilateral action. Understanding the incentives of unilateral actors opens two promising inroads for climate action: strengthening unilateral action by playing to these incentives and building on unilateral action to make collective action more obtainable.

Suggested Citation

Daniels, Brigham, Why Stop Grazing the Climate Commons? (June 23, 2023). Michigan Journal of Environmental and Administrative Law, Forthcoming , University of Utah College of Law Research Paper No. 556, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4489923 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4489923

Brigham Daniels (Contact Author)

University of Utah College of Law ( email )

383 S. University Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84112-0730
United States

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