Playing Games With GPT: What Can We Learn About a Large Language Model From Canonical Strategic Games?

15 Pages Posted: 10 Jul 2023 Last revised: 8 Mar 2024

See all articles by Philip Brookins

Philip Brookins

University of South Carolina

Jason Matthew DeBacker

University of South Carolina - Moore School of Business - Department of Economics

Date Written: June 28, 2023

Abstract

We aim to understand fundamental preferences over fairness and cooperation embedded in artificial intelligence (AI). We do this by having a large language model (LLM), GPT-3.5, play two classic games: the dictator game and the prisoner's dilemma. We compare the decisions of the LLM to those of humans in laboratory experiments. We find that the LLM replicates human tendencies towards fairness and cooperation. It does not choose the optimal strategy in most cases. Rather, it shows a tendency towards fairness in the dictator game, even more so than human participants. In the prisoner's dilemma, the LLM displays rates of cooperation much higher than human participants (about 65% versus 37% for humans). These findings aid our understanding of the ethics and rationality embedded in AI.

Keywords: Large language models (LLMs), Generative Pre-trained Transformer (GPT), Experimental Economics, Game Theory, AI

JEL Classification: D01, C72, C90

Suggested Citation

Brookins, Philip and DeBacker, Jason Matthew, Playing Games With GPT: What Can We Learn About a Large Language Model From Canonical Strategic Games? (June 28, 2023). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4493398 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4493398

Philip Brookins

University of South Carolina ( email )

Department of Economics
1014 Greene St
Columbia, SC 29208
United States
8037773603 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://philipbrookins.com

Jason Matthew DeBacker (Contact Author)

University of South Carolina - Moore School of Business - Department of Economics ( email )

1014 Greene St
Columbia, SC 29208
United States

HOME PAGE: http://jasondebacker.com

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