Corporate Tax Disclosure

68 Pages Posted: 17 Jul 2023

See all articles by Jeffrey L. Hoopes

Jeffrey L. Hoopes

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill - Accounting Area

Leslie A. Robinson

Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business; Dartmouth College - Accounting

Joel B. Slemrod

University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: July 7, 2023

Abstract

Policies that require, or recommend, disclosure of corporate tax information are becoming more common throughout the world, as are examples of tax-related information increasingly influencing public policy and perceptions. In addition, companies are increasing the voluntary provision of tax-related information. We describe those trends and place them within a taxonomy of public and private tax disclosure. We then review the academic literature on corporate tax disclosures and discuss what is known about their effects. One key takeaway is the paucity of evidence that many tax disclosures mandated with the aim of increasing tax revenue have produced additional revenue. We highlight many crucial unanswered questions, answers to which would inform future tax legislation and financial accounting rule making.

Keywords: tax disclosure, financial accounting disclosure, mandatory disclosure voluntary disclosure, public policy

JEL Classification: H25, M48

Suggested Citation

Hoopes, Jeffrey L. and Robinson, Leslie and Slemrod, Joel B., Corporate Tax Disclosure (July 7, 2023). Kenan Institute of Private Enterprise Research Paper No. 4503483, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4503483 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4503483

Jeffrey L. Hoopes

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill - Accounting Area ( email )

McColl Building
Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3490
United States

Leslie Robinson (Contact Author)

Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business ( email )

Hanover, NH 03755
United States

Dartmouth College - Accounting ( email )

100 Tuck Hall
Hanover, NH 03755
United States
603-646-4018 (Phone)

Joel B. Slemrod

University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business ( email )

701 Tappan Street
Room R5396
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1234
United States
734-936-3914 (Phone)
734-763-4032 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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