Pay Transparency in Heterogeneous Teams: Could Some Fairness Concerns Hurt Productivity?

45 Pages Posted: 10 Jul 2023 Last revised: 19 Dec 2023

See all articles by Lin Chen

Lin Chen

INSEAD - Technology and Operations Management

Antoine Désir

INSEAD

Guillaume Roels

INSEAD - Technology and Operations Management

Date Written: July 25, 2024

Abstract

In homogeneous teams, pay transparency, which induces agents to compare themselves to others, leads to a higher output (and thus, a higher payoff for the principal managing them), results in no inequalities in equilibrium (i.e., agents find the outcome fair), and is inclusive (i.e., all agents are engaged in production). This is true irrespective of the basis of social comparisons: income, utility, or reward. How about heterogeneous teams? Could pay transparency backfire under some types of fairness concerns? Methodology/Results: We consider a model of a principal and two agents of different abilities who are averse to inequalities between each other under pay transparency. We study three bases of comparison: income, utility, and reward. For each type of fairness concern, we characterize when pay transparency leads to a higher or lower payoff for the principal, results or not in inequalities between agents, and involves only one or both agents in production. We find that income fairness never benefits the principal and might be perceived as unfair and non-inclusive, in contrast to reward fairness, which is always beneficial on all three fronts. Utility fairness lies somewhere in between, offering benefits on all three fronts when agents are not so heterogeneous, but hurting fairness and inclusivity without changing the principal's payoff otherwise. Managerial Implications: Although pay transparency can help close the gender pay gap, anchoring agents to income fairness by disclosing only their incomes can hurt their productivity while creating feelings of unfairness and lack of inclusivity. In contrast, anchoring them to reward or utility fairness by contextualizing their incomes with their individual contributions or costs may be beneficial on all three fronts.

Keywords: Fairness, Principal-Agent, Teams, Moral Hazard, Inequality Aversion, Heterogeneity, Pay Transparency fairness, principal-agent, teams, moral hazard, inequality aversion, heterogeneity, pay transparency

Suggested Citation

Chen, Lin and Désir, Antoine and Roels, Guillaume, Pay Transparency in Heterogeneous Teams: Could Some Fairness Concerns Hurt Productivity? (July 25, 2024). INSEAD Working Paper No. 2024/43/TOM, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4503491 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4503491

Lin Chen

INSEAD - Technology and Operations Management ( email )

Boulevard de Constance
77 305 Fontainebleau Cedex
France

Antoine Désir

INSEAD ( email )

Boulevard de Constance
77305 Fontainebleau Cedex
France

Guillaume Roels (Contact Author)

INSEAD - Technology and Operations Management ( email )

Boulevard de Constance
77 305 Fontainebleau Cedex
France

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