Tainted beginnings, risky endings: The effect of inadvertent prenatal pollution exposure on CEO risk-taking

92 Pages Posted: 17 Jul 2023 Last revised: 9 Aug 2023

See all articles by P. Raghavendra Rau

P. Raghavendra Rau

University of Cambridge

YiLin Wu

National Taiwan University - Department of Economics

Lok-Si Ieong

City University of New York, Baruch College - Zicklin School of Business - Department of Economics and Finance

Date Written: August 8, 2023

Abstract

We investigate the influence of prenatal exposure to toxic environments on CEOs’ risk-taking behavior, specifically focusing on CEOs born in areas later designated as Superfund sites — the most hazardous waste sites in the U.S. Previous literature has explored how CEOs’ early-life experiences shape corporate policies, but these studies typically face selection bias issues. Our study addresses this gap by examining an exogenous factor—pollution—that likely affects CEO risk preferences without being influenced by parental or CEO choices. We find that firms managed by these Superfund CEOs exhibit riskier financial and investment policies that do not yield higher returns, adversely affecting firm performance and the CEO’s career longevity on average. Additionally, Superfund CEOs are more likely to be promoted internally, suggesting that their risk-taking tendencies become evident only after reaching top executive positions. Our paper contributes to understanding how exogenous environmental factors can have long-term effects on decision-making at the highest levels of corporate governance.

Keywords: Superfund, Environmental risk, Developmental toxicity, Fetal origins hypothesis, Risk-taking

JEL Classification: D22, D90, D91, I10, Q50, Q53

Suggested Citation

Rau, P. Raghavendra and Wu, YiLin and Ieong, Lok-Si, Tainted beginnings, risky endings: The effect of inadvertent prenatal pollution exposure on CEO risk-taking (August 8, 2023). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4503598 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4503598

P. Raghavendra Rau (Contact Author)

University of Cambridge ( email )

Cambridge Judge Business School
Trumpington Street
Cambridge, Cambridgeshire CB21AG
United Kingdom
3103626793 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.raghurau.com/

YiLin Wu

National Taiwan University - Department of Economics ( email )

21 Hsiu Chow Rd
Taipei, 10020
Taiwan

Lok-Si Ieong

City University of New York, Baruch College - Zicklin School of Business - Department of Economics and Finance ( email )

17 Lexington Avenue
New York, NY 10010
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.richardlsieong.com

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