Electoral College and Election Fraud

35 Pages Posted: 12 Jul 2023

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: July 10, 2023

Abstract

One frequently overlooked aspect of the U.S.-style electoral college system is that it discourages election fraud. In a presidential election based on the popular vote, competing political parties are motivated to manipulate votes in areas where they hold the most significant influence, such as states where they control local executive offices, legislatures, and the judiciary. However, with the electoral college system in place, the incentives for fraud shift to swing states where the local government is politically divided, and fraud is therefore more difficult and costly. Our theoretical model elucidates why the electoral college system provides more effective protection against election fraud compared to the popular vote system. While polarization makes fraud more likely, it does not affect the superiority of the electoral college system.

Keywords: presidential elections, electoral college, election fraud

JEL Classification: P16, D74

Suggested Citation

Egorov, Georgy and Sonin, Konstantin, Electoral College and Election Fraud (July 10, 2023). University of Chicago, Becker Friedman Institute for Economics Working Paper No. 2023-93, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4507012 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4507012

Georgy Egorov

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management ( email )

2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States

NBER ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Konstantin Sonin (Contact Author)

University of Chicago - Harris School of Public Policy ( email )

1155 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

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