What You Do (Not) Get When Expanding the Net - Evidence from Forced Taxpayer Registrations in South Africa

71 Pages Posted: 13 Jul 2023

See all articles by Collen Lediga

Collen Lediga

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Nadine Riedel

University of Münster

Kristina Strohmaier

University of Duisburg-Essen

Abstract

A significant share of firms in developing countries is not registered for income taxation. Expanding the tax net is a priority for many governments, but most formalization policies proved ineffective in bringing firms into the tax net. Drawing on tax administrative data, we document that snapshot-synchronizations of the business tax and the commercial registry in South Africa led to a large-scale expansion of the South African taxpayer net. While the targeted firms are a valuable segment within the non-formal sector, we show that their post-registration tax compliance is weak and few of them pay taxes. Owing to the large scope of the net expansion, the aggregate revenue gains are, nevertheless, non-negligible and the interventions are fiscally cost-effective. Additionally, we provide evidence for enforcement spillovers: In areas, where many firms were drawn into the tax net, registration compliance significantly improved after the synchronizations, while registrations at the commercial registry moderately declined.

Keywords: formalization policy, tax authority digitization, Developing countries

Suggested Citation

Lediga, Collen and Riedel, Nadine and Strohmaier, Kristina, What You Do (Not) Get When Expanding the Net - Evidence from Forced Taxpayer Registrations in South Africa. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4509299 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4509299

Collen Lediga

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

No Address Available

Nadine Riedel (Contact Author)

University of Münster ( email )

Universitätsstraße 14-16
Münster, 48143
Germany

Kristina Strohmaier

University of Duisburg-Essen ( email )

Lotharstrasse 1
Duisburg, 47048
Germany

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