Corporate Tax Disclosure

69 Pages Posted: 17 Jul 2023 Last revised: 23 Dec 2024

See all articles by Jeffrey Hoopes

Jeffrey Hoopes

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill

Leslie A. Robinson

Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business; Dartmouth College - Accounting

Joel B. Slemrod

University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: July 2023

Abstract

Policies that require, or recommend, disclosure of corporate tax information are becoming more common throughout the world, as are examples of tax-related information increasingly influencing public policy and perceptions. In addition, companies are increasing the voluntary provision of tax-related information. We describe those trends and place them within a taxonomy of public and private tax disclosure. We then review the academic literature on corporate tax disclosures and discuss what is known about their effects. One key takeaway is the paucity of evidence that many tax disclosures mandated with the aim of increasing tax revenue have produced additional revenue. We highlight many crucial unanswered questions, answers to which would inform future tax legislation and financial accounting rule making.

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Suggested Citation

Hoopes, Jeffrey and Robinson, Leslie and Slemrod, Joel B., Corporate Tax Disclosure (July 2023). NBER Working Paper No. w31467, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4512501

Jeffrey Hoopes (Contact Author)

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill

Leslie Robinson

Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business ( email )

Hanover, NH 03755
United States

Dartmouth College - Accounting ( email )

100 Tuck Hall
Hanover, NH 03755
United States
603-646-4018 (Phone)

Joel B. Slemrod

University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business ( email )

701 Tappan Street
Room R5396
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1234
United States
734-936-3914 (Phone)
734-763-4032 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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