Please Take Over: Xai, Delegation of Authority, and Domain Knowledge

43 Pages Posted: 18 Jul 2023

See all articles by Kevin Bauer

Kevin Bauer

University of Mannheim; Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE

Moritz von Zahn

Goethe University Frankfurt

Oliver Hinz

Goethe University Frankfurt - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration

Date Written: July 15, 2023

Abstract

Recent regulatory measures such as the European Union’s AI Act re-quire artificial intelligence (AI) systems to be explainable. As such, under-standing how explainability impacts human-AI interaction and pinpoint-ing the specific circumstances and groups affected, is imperative. In this study, we devise a formal framework and conduct an empirical investiga-tion involving real estate agents to explore the complex interplay between explainability of and delegation to AI systems. On an aggregate level, our findings indicate that real estate agents display a higher propensity to delegate apartment evaluations to an AI system when its workings are explainable, thereby surrendering control to the machine. However, at an individual level, we detect considerable heterogeneity. Agents possess-ing extensive domain knowledge are generally more inclined to delegate decisions to AI and minimize their effort when provided with explana-tions. Conversely, agents with limited domain knowledge only exhibit this behavior when explanations correspond with their preconceived no-tions regarding the relationship between apartment features and listing prices. Our results illustrate that the introduction of explainability in AI systems may transfer the decision-making control from humans to AI under the veil of transparency, which has notable implications for policy makers and practitioners that we discuss.

Suggested Citation

Bauer, Kevin and von Zahn, Moritz and Hinz, Oliver, Please Take Over: Xai, Delegation of Authority, and Domain Knowledge (July 15, 2023). SAFE Working Paper No. 394, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4512594 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4512594

Kevin Bauer (Contact Author)

University of Mannheim ( email )

L15
1-6
Mannheim, 68131
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.bwl.uni-mannheim.de/bauer/

Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE ( email )

(http://www.safe-frankfurt.de)
Theodor-W.-Adorno-Platz 3
Frankfurt am Main, 60323
Germany

Moritz Von Zahn

Goethe University Frankfurt ( email )

Grüneburgplatz 1
Frankfurt am Main, 60323
Germany

Oliver Hinz

Goethe University Frankfurt - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration ( email )

Mertonstrasse 17-25
Frankfurt am Main, D-60325
Germany

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