How Does State Ownership Affect Firm Innovation? Evidence From China’s 2009–2010 Stimulus Plan

67 Pages Posted: 27 Jul 2023 Last revised: 27 Jul 2023

See all articles by Caroline Betts

Caroline Betts

Department of Economics, University of Southern California

Yu Cao

World Bank

Date Written: July 1, 2023

Abstract

We examine the effects of China's 2009-2010 stimulus package for innovation differentials between state-owned firms (SOEs) and privately-owned firms (POEs). Using a unique dataset of Chinese manufacturing firms, we find that in the pre-stimulus period SOEs patent at a lower rate than POEs in the least inventive patent category, and at a comparable rate in the more inventive categories. Post-stimulus, SOEs patent at an even lower rate relative to POEs in the least inventive category, but significant, positive SOE-POE patent rate differentials emerge in more inventive patent categories. The stimulus disproportionately benefited SOEs with higher investment subsidies and lower finance costs—institutional support which we find mediates roughly 45 percent of all positive effects of state-ownership for innovation. Institutional support produces larger SOE-POE innovation differentials among firms in strategic sectors and located in high-marketization provinces, and for centrally controlled SOEs.

Keywords: Enterprises and Development, Firms and Development, Growth, Innovation, Manufacturing, Technological Change, China.

JEL Classification: O12, O14, O23, O25, O38

Suggested Citation

Betts, Caroline and Cao, Yu, How Does State Ownership Affect Firm Innovation? Evidence From China’s 2009–2010 Stimulus Plan (July 1, 2023). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4519021 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4519021

Caroline Betts (Contact Author)

Department of Economics, University of Southern California ( email )

3620 South Vermont Ave. Kaprielian (KAP) Hall, 300
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States

Yu Cao

World Bank

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