Wearing Out the Watchdog: The Impact of SEC Case Backlog on the Formal Investigation Process

The Accounting Review, Forthcoming

48 Pages Posted: 27 Jul 2023

See all articles by Samuel B. Bonsall

Samuel B. Bonsall

Pennsylvania State University - Department of Accounting

Eric Holzman

Indiana University

Brian P. Miller

Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Accounting

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: July 19, 2023

Abstract

We examine a comprehensive set of investigations by the SEC’s Division of Enforcement offices to provide evidence on the consequences of these office’s busyness on the formal investigation process. We find that higher office case backlog decreases the likelihood of an investigation into a restating firm. Our results show no evidence that higher backlogs affect the SEC’s ability to pursue cases involving revenue recognition issues and high insider trading, which is consistent with the agency’s stated priorities. But our findings indicate that busy SEC offices are less likely to pursue cases with the largest shareholder losses, which is inconsistent with SEC priorities. Backlog also impacts pursued investigations, leading to more prolonged investigations, a lower AAER likelihood, and smaller SEC penalties. Our evidence suggests that busyness undermines the SEC’s investigation process.

Keywords: SEC enforcement, investigations, misreporting, financial misconduct

JEL Classification: G18, G38, K42, M41

Suggested Citation

Bonsall, Samuel B. and Holzman, Eric and Miller, Brian P., Wearing Out the Watchdog: The Impact of SEC Case Backlog on the Formal Investigation Process (July 19, 2023). The Accounting Review, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4520927

Samuel B. Bonsall

Pennsylvania State University - Department of Accounting ( email )

University Park, PA 16802-3306
United States

Eric Holzman

Indiana University ( email )

1309 E. 10th Street
Bloomington, IN 47405
United States

Brian P. Miller (Contact Author)

Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Accounting ( email )

1309 E. 10th Street
Bloomington, IN 47405
United States
812-855-2606 (Phone)

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