Digital Picket Lines: Strategic Employee Disclosure

67 Pages Posted: 2 Aug 2023 Last revised: 26 Jun 2024

See all articles by Brigham Brau

Brigham Brau

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill - Kenan-Flagler Business School

Junyoung Jeong

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill - Accounting Area

Date Written: April 13, 2023

Abstract

Using survey and archival data, we examine how employees strategically disclose information. We find that when unions renegotiate collective bargaining agreements (CBAs), employees write more Glassdoor reviews and leave lower ratings. Our survey responses from over 300 union representatives indicate encouraging strategic disclosure by employees on online platforms is a common union strategy. Building on survey responses, we demonstrate that strategic disclosure during CBA renegotiation intensifies when the union is less exposed to right to work laws and when the union is less exposed to unfair labor practices. We then document that strategic reviews are associated with improved workplace conditions, time to fill new jobs, and better contract wage outcomes. We conclude that employees strategically disclose information about their employers online, and that their disclosure has economic consequences for employing firms.

Keywords: Strategic disclosure, union negotiations, labor markets, information, social media

JEL Classification: E24, G34, G41, M41

Suggested Citation

Brau, Brigham and Jeong, Junyoung, Digital Picket Lines: Strategic Employee Disclosure (April 13, 2023). Kenan Institute of Private Enterprise Research Paper No. 4527388, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4527388 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4527388

Brigham Brau (Contact Author)

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill - Kenan-Flagler Business School ( email )

McColl Building
Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3490
United States

Junyoung Jeong

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill - Accounting Area ( email )

McColl Building
Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3490
United States

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