Contested Transparency: Digital Monitoring Technologies and Worker Voice *

57 Pages Posted: 3 Aug 2023 Last revised: 25 Oct 2023

See all articles by Filippo Belloc

Filippo Belloc

University of Siena

Gabriel Burdin

University of Leeds - Faculty of Business; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Stefano Dughera

University of Turin

Fabio Landini

University of Parma

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 15, 2023

Abstract

Advances in artificial intelligence and data analytics have notably expanded employers’ monitoring and surveillance capabilities. While new digital monitoring (DM) technologies facilitate the accurate observability of work effort, their productivity and broader welfare implications remain subject of debate. In this context, many countries confer information, consultation and co-determination rights to employee representation (ER) bodies on matters related to workplace organization and the  introduction of new technologies, which could potentially discourage employers from making DM investments.
Using a cross-sectional sample of more than 21000 European establishments, we find instead that establishments with ER are more likely to utilize DM technologies than establishments without ER. We also document a positive effect of ER on DM utilization in the context of a local-randomization regression discontinuity analysis that exploits size-contingent policy rules governing the operation of ER bodies in Europe. We rationalize this unexpected finding through the lens of a theoretical model
in which shared governance via ER creates organizational safeguards that mitigate workers' control-averse responses to monitoring.

Keywords: Digital-based monitoring, technology, control aversion, worker voice, employee representation JEL: J5, M54, 032

JEL Classification: M5, J50, O32, O33

Suggested Citation

Belloc, Filippo and Burdin, Gabriel and Dughera, Stefano and Landini, Fabio, Contested Transparency: Digital Monitoring Technologies and Worker Voice * (October 15, 2023). Leeds University Business School Working Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4528975 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4528975

Filippo Belloc

University of Siena ( email )

Via Banchi di Sotto, 55
Siena, 53100
Italy

Gabriel Burdin (Contact Author)

University of Leeds - Faculty of Business ( email )

Leeds LS2 9JT
United Kingdom

IZA Institute of Labor Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Stefano Dughera

University of Turin ( email )

Fabio Landini

University of Parma ( email )

Parma
Italy

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