The Cost of Regulatory Compliance in the United States

74 Pages Posted: 8 Aug 2023

See all articles by Francesco Trebbi

Francesco Trebbi

University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Miao Ben Zhang

University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business - Finance and Business Economics Department

Michael Simkovic

University of Southern California Gould School of Law; University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: 2023

Abstract

One of the key questions in the study of regulation is whether the costs of regulatory compliance fall homogeneously on all businesses or whether certain firms, for instance small ones, are especially penalized. We quantify firms’ compliance costs in terms of their labor spending to adhere to government rules. Using comprehensive establishment-level occupational microdata and occupation-specific task information, we recover the proportion of a firm’s wage bill attributable to employees engaged in regulatory compliance. On average for 2002-14, regulatory costs account for 1.34% to 3.33% of a firm’s wage bill, totaling up in 2014 to $239 billion, and to $289 billion when adding capital equipment costs. Our findings reveal an inverted-U relation between firms’ regulatory compliance costs and their scale of employment, indicating that firms with approximately 500 employees face compliance costs that are about 40 percent higher as a share of total wages compared to small or large firms. Finally, we develop an instrumental variable methodology to disentangle the influence of regulatory requirements and enforcement in driving firms’ compliance costs.

Keywords: regulation, compliance costs, labor task, occupation, firm growth, economies of scale, regulatory requirement, enforcement

JEL Classification: P000

Suggested Citation

Trebbi, Francesco and Zhang, Miao Ben and Simkovic, Michael, The Cost of Regulatory Compliance in the United States (2023). CESifo Working Paper No. 10589, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4534628 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4534628

Francesco Trebbi (Contact Author)

University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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Miao Ben Zhang

University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business - Finance and Business Economics Department ( email )

Marshall School of Business
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.MiaoBenZhang.com/

Michael Simkovic

University of Southern California Gould School of Law ( email )

699 Exposition Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States

University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business ( email )

701 Exposition Blvd
Los Angeles, CA California 90089
United States

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