Schrödinger’s Dissent: The Hybrid Authority of a Dissenting Opinion

43 Pages Posted: 14 Aug 2023

See all articles by Christina Frohock

Christina Frohock

University of Miami - School of Law

Date Written: August 9, 2023

Abstract

A dissenting opinion is the Schrödinger’s cat of authorities: both the law and not the law simultaneously. Courts and scholars often clarify that a dissenting opinion is not binding. Outside the universe of precedent, that authority defies easy description. Emerging from the pen of a judge wearing a black robe and acting in an official capacity, a dissenting opinion exhibits the form of the law. Yet, beneath that lofty sheen, a dissent exhibits the substance of commentary. A dissenting judge writes to undercut the law, providing a case law coda. This Article describes the traditional categories of authority, primary and secondary, and argues that a dissenting opinion inhabits a hybrid category. As primary authority, a dissent enjoys the same rhetorical leeway as other opinions; as secondary authority, a dissent is an untethered critique of the law. Over the years, dissenting opinions from the Supreme Court provide enduring examples of a dissent’s mix of primary and secondary authority.

Keywords: dissenting opinion, primary authority, secondary authority, Supreme Court, sovereignty

Suggested Citation

Frohock, Christina, Schrödinger’s Dissent: The Hybrid Authority of a Dissenting Opinion (August 9, 2023). Marquette Law Review, vol. 107, page 963 (2024)., University of Miami Legal Studies Research Paper No. 4536243, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4536243

Christina Frohock (Contact Author)

University of Miami - School of Law ( email )

P.O. Box 248087
Coral Gables, FL 33146
United States

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