The European Central Bank: Reshaping Monetary Politics in Europe

51 Pages Posted: 9 Jul 2004 Last revised: 21 Jul 2010

See all articles by Alberto F. Alesina

Alberto F. Alesina

Harvard University - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Vittorio Grilli

Independent; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: October 1991

Abstract

This paper studies how the creation of a European Central Bank (ECB) will change the political economy of monetary policy in Europe. The twelve governors of the national Central Banks of the EEC have recently proposed a statute for the ECB which delineates its institutional structure. In this paper, we discuss the likely consequences of this statute on the conduct of monetary policy at the European level, particularly from the point of view of the trade-off between inflation and stabilization. We analyze the role of political independence of the ECB and the effect of voting rules for the appointments of the ECB board members on policy choices.

Suggested Citation

Alesina, Alberto F. and Grilli, Vittorio, The European Central Bank: Reshaping Monetary Politics in Europe (October 1991). NBER Working Paper No. w3860. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=453813

Alberto F. Alesina (Contact Author)

Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )

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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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United Kingdom

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Vittorio Grilli

Independent

Ministero del Tesoro
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Roma 00187

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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United States

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