Employee Trust and Performance Constraints in Public Sector Organizations

61 Pages Posted: 14 Aug 2023

See all articles by Philip Keefer

Philip Keefer

Inter-American Development Bank

Razvan Vlaicu

Inter-American Development Bank; University of Maryland

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Abstract

Theory suggests that employee trust is key to productivity in organizations, but empirical evidence documenting links between trust and performance constraints is scarce. This paper analyzes self-collected observational and experimental data on public sector employees from eighteen Latin American countries and finds that individual-level trust is relevant to three types of performance factors. First, high-trust employees are more willing to collaborate and share information with coworkers and are more supportive of technological innovation. Second, high-trust employees have di⁄erent perceptions of organizational constraints: they are less concerned with low staff turnoverquality or lack of discretion to innovate, and more concerned with staff turnover shortages. Third, trust in coworkers is associated with stronger mission motivation. These findings are robust to instrumental variable strategies based on the transmission of trust through social or professional channels. A survey experiment on preferences for social distancing policies shows how trust enhances mission motivation: employee policy preferences align better with the implied government policy when their trust in the public sector is higher.

Keywords: trust, performance, public sector, mission motivation, survey experiments

Suggested Citation

Keefer, Philip and Vlaicu, Razvan, Employee Trust and Performance Constraints in Public Sector Organizations. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4538412 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4538412

Philip Keefer (Contact Author)

Inter-American Development Bank ( email )

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Washington, DC 20577
United States
202-623-1961 (Phone)

Razvan Vlaicu

Inter-American Development Bank ( email )

1300 New York Ave NW
Washington, DC 20577
United States

University of Maryland ( email )

3114 Tydings Hall
College Park, MD 20742
United States

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