Collaboration Among Content Creators

48 Pages Posted: 13 Aug 2023 Last revised: 20 Feb 2024

See all articles by Jasmine Yang

Jasmine Yang

Columbia University - Columbia Business School

Qifan Han

Boston University

Kinshuk Jerath

Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Marketing

Date Written: August 12, 2023


We study content collaboration in the creator economy, in which competing creators mutually agree to collaborate on joint content and negotiate on content production and revenue sharing. Using a game theory model with creators competing for consumers on a Hotelling line, we show that collaboration allows creators to use the jointly-produced content to moderate competition, while using their individual content to expand into new audiences. This increases content diversity but also leads to increased monetizability of content. In general, collaboration among creators has an effect of increasing the profits of creators while reducing consumer surplus. When creators create content with heterogeneous entertainment values, the creator producing content of lower entertainment value has an incentive to free ride on the collaborative content. This free riding may increase surplus for consumers (who without collaboration would watch content of low entertainment value), thereby improving creators’ profits as well as consumer surplus. Our results provide guidance to content creators, to platforms designing tools to facilitate collaborations, and to policy makers.

Keywords: Creator economy, influencer marketing, content collaboration, bargaining, game theory

Suggested Citation

Yang, Jasmine and Han, Qifan and Jerath, Kinshuk, Collaboration Among Content Creators (August 12, 2023). Available at SSRN: or

Jasmine Yang (Contact Author)

Columbia University - Columbia Business School ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

Qifan Han

Boston University ( email )

595 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States

Kinshuk Jerath

Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Marketing ( email )

New York, NY 10027
United States

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