Reproductive Objectification

46 Pages Posted: 25 Aug 2023

See all articles by Meghan Boone

Meghan Boone

Wake Forest University School of Law

Benjamin McMichael

University of Alabama

Date Written: August 2022

Abstract

The American system of rights is individualized – premised on the concept of singular, physically separate, and autonomous people. The rise of the fetal personhood movement complicates this basic understanding. If rights attach to singular, autonomous people, and fetuses are legally people, then the body of a pregnant person becomes conceptually unintelligible as it contains potentially two, interrelated people. Such a circumstance is fundamentally a contradiction within a framework that insists that rights attach to people who are, by definition, singular, separate and autonomous.

This Article argues that, as a result of this apparent contradiction, fetal personhood laws make the humanity of the pregnant person conceptually precarious. If the law has no framework for two rights holders in one body, then the pregnant person must be something else entirely. She becomes less of a subject and more of an object – a reproductive vessel, merely the container for another individual rights’ holder. Reproductive justice scholars and advocates have long argued that laws purporting to endow the fetus with personhood exacerbate the “maternal-fetal conflict” and undermine pregnant people’s rights. This Article argues, relying on both decades of feminist legal theory and original empirical evidence, that granting full personhood to a fetus has an even more insidious outcome – undermining the legal personhood of women entirely and recategorizing them in the eyes of the law as non-person objects. Looking across cultures and eras, it is unfortunately not difficult to ascertain what might happen when human beings are treated as objects. Such objectification results in almost certain abuse, sometimes of the most horrifying variety.

Keywords: Reproductive Justice, Fetal Personhood, Feminist Legal Theory

Suggested Citation

Boone, Meghan and McMichael, Benjamin, Reproductive Objectification (August 2022). Minnesota Law Review, Forthcoming, Wake Forest Univ. Legal Studies Paper No. 4540406, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4540406 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4540406

Meghan Boone (Contact Author)

Wake Forest University School of Law ( email )

P.O. Box 7206
Winston-Salem, NC 27109
United States

HOME PAGE: http://law.wfu.edu/faculty/profile/boonemm/

Benjamin McMichael

University of Alabama ( email )

101 Paul W. Bryant Dr.
Box 870382
Tuscaloosa, AL 35487
United States

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