Monotone Comparative Statics and Bounds on Strategic Influence

31 Pages Posted: 6 Sep 2023

See all articles by Rabah Amir

Rabah Amir

University of Iowa - Henry B. Tippie College of Business - Department of Economics

David Rietzke

Lancaster University - Department of Economics

Date Written: August 16, 2023

Abstract

We employ lattice-theoretic techniques to provide sufficient conditions under which sets of pure-strategy Nash equilibria across games are comparable. Differentiating our approach from previous literature, our conditions do not require any notion of complementarity between players' actions or within the components of an individual player's action. Instead, our conditions imply a bound on the magnitude of behavioral changes that stem from the interactions between actions. Our results have broad applications throughout economics, particularly in industrial organization.

Keywords: Monotone comparative statics, supermodularity, non-monotonic best-replies, Cournot Oligopoly, Bertrand oligopoly, Pareto efficiency

JEL Classification: C61, C72, D43

Suggested Citation

Amir, Rabah and Rietzke, David, Monotone Comparative Statics and Bounds on Strategic Influence (August 16, 2023). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4542103 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4542103

Rabah Amir

University of Iowa - Henry B. Tippie College of Business - Department of Economics ( email )

108 Pappajohn Building
Iowa City, IA 52242
United States

David Rietzke (Contact Author)

Lancaster University - Department of Economics ( email )

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
45
Abstract Views
153
PlumX Metrics