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Mortality Contingent Claims, Health Care, and Social Insurance

29 Pages Posted: 14 Jan 1997 Last revised: 4 Oct 2010

Tomas Philipson

University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Gary S. Becker

University of Chicago - Department of Economics; University of Chicago - Booth School of Business

Date Written: September 1996

Abstract

This paper analyzes the savings and health care impacts of mortality contingent claims, defined here as income measures, such as annuities and life-insurance, under which earned income is contingent on the length of one's life. The postwar increase in mandatory annuity and life-insurance programs, as well as the rapid increase in life-expectancy, motivates a better understanding of the effects that mortality contingent claims have on resources devoted to life-extension. We analyze the incentives that such claims imply for life-extension when resources may affect mortality endogenously and argue that these incentives dramatically alter the standard conclusions obtained when mortality is treated exogenously.

Suggested Citation

Philipson, Tomas and Becker, Gary S., Mortality Contingent Claims, Health Care, and Social Insurance (September 1996). NBER Working Paper No. w5760. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4554

Tomas J. Philipson (Contact Author)

University of Chicago ( email )

Graduate School of Business
1101 East 58th Street
Chicago, 60637

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Gary S. Becker

University of Chicago - Department of Economics ( email )

1126 East 59th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business

5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

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