When Amazon Drivers Kill: Accidents, Agency Law, and the Contractor Economy

69 Pages Posted: 25 Sep 2023 Last revised: 23 Apr 2024

See all articles by Keith Cunningham-Parmeter

Keith Cunningham-Parmeter

Lewis & Clark College - Lewis & Clark Law School

Date Written: September 4, 2023

Abstract

Amazon vans and Uber drivers frequently crash into other cars. Despite the many injuries and deaths that result from these accidents, Amazon and Uber deny responsibility for such claims because they categorize their drivers as “independent contractors.” But this contractor defense distorts the basic rules of agency law. Over a century ago, courts crafted agency standards that forced businesses to pay for the harms that their workers caused. Since that time, American firms have attempted to skirt this rule by labeling their workers as "contractors" rather than as "employees." Aware of this age-old tactic to avoid liability, courts historically built sufficient flexibility into agency standards to hold companies responsible for injuries to others, even when ostensible “contractors” committed those torts. In the years to come, a growing number of drivers for Amazon, Uber, and other on-demand firms will hit the road, make mistakes, and harm members of the public. Applying agency standards to this emerging problem, this Article develops a legal framework for determining when to hold on-demand firms accountable for the accidents that their contractors cause.

Keywords: gig economy, platform workers, agency law, employment law, vicarious liability

Suggested Citation

Cunningham-Parmeter, Keith, When Amazon Drivers Kill: Accidents, Agency Law, and the Contractor Economy (September 4, 2023). William & Mary Law Review, Vol. 65, p. 581, 2024, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4561492

Keith Cunningham-Parmeter (Contact Author)

Lewis & Clark College - Lewis & Clark Law School ( email )

10101 S. Terwilliger Boulevard
Portland, OR 97219-7762
503-768-6640 (Phone)

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