Ex-Post Approaches to Prioritarianism and Sufficientarianism

40 Pages Posted: 12 Sep 2023 Last revised: 22 Apr 2024

See all articles by Matthew D. Adler

Matthew D. Adler

Duke University School of Law

Walter Bossert

University of Montreal Department of Economics

Susumu Cato

University of Tokyo

Kohei Kamaga

Faculty of Economics, Sophia University

Date Written: September 9, 2023

Abstract

Although sufficientarianism has been gaining interest as a theory of distributive justice in recent years, it has not been examined in the presence of risk. We propose an ex-post approach to sufficientarianism that has a strong link to ex-post prioritarianism. Both ex-post criteria are based on an axiom that we refer to as prospect independence of the unconcerned, a natural extension of the independence axiom known from the literature that focuses on situations with no risk. We characterize a class of ex-post prioritarian orderings as well as the corresponding class of ex-post sufficientarian orderings. In addition, we point out some important differences between these two ex-post criteria, and we examine how they fare when assessed in terms of specific ex-ante Paretian axioms.

Keywords: sufficientarianism, prioritarianism, risk, Pareto axioms independence axioms

JEL Classification: D63, D81

Suggested Citation

Adler, Matthew D. and Bossert, Walter and Cato, Susumu and Kamaga, Kohei, Ex-Post Approaches to Prioritarianism and Sufficientarianism (September 9, 2023). Duke Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Series No. 2023-53, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4569519 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4569519

Matthew D. Adler (Contact Author)

Duke University School of Law ( email )

210 Science Drive
Box 90362
Durham, NC 27708
United States

Walter Bossert

University of Montreal Department of Economics ( email )

PO Box 6128, Station Downtown
Montreal, Quebec H3C 3J7
Canada

Susumu Cato

University of Tokyo ( email )

7-3-1 Hongo
Bunkyo-ku
Tokyo, Tokyo 133-033
Japan

Kohei Kamaga

Faculty of Economics, Sophia University ( email )

7-1, Kioi-cho
Chiyoda-ku
Tokyo, 1028554
Japan

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