Do ESG Preferences Survive in the Trading Room? An Experimental Study

76 Pages Posted: 19 Sep 2023 Last revised: 5 Apr 2024

See all articles by Alexander Bassen

Alexander Bassen

University of Hamburg; University of Reading - ICMA Centre

Rajna Gibson

University of Geneva - Geneva Finance Research Institute (GFRI); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Andreas G. F. Hoepner

Smurfit Graduate Business School, University College Dublin; European Commission - DG FISMA

Johannes Klausmann

University of Virginia - Darden School of Business

Ioannis Oikonomou

University of Reading - ICMA Centre

Date Written: September 16, 2023

Abstract

We conduct a trading experiment within a competitive tournament setting to investigate whether Socially Responsible Investors (SRIs) and students trade in coherence with their stated ESG preferences. Our findings indicate that participants who claim to have high ESG preferences trade inconsistently with patterns usually observed in responsible investing, i.e. longer investment horizons. Trading decisions are primarily driven by financial considerations and not ESG preferences. We conclude that stronger stated ESG preferences do not survive in a competitive trading room that rewards profit maximization. However, SRIs - professionals employed by PRI signatories - trade less aggressively on short-term news than students.

Keywords: F340, M410, Q5, M370 ESG reporting, signaling theory, refinancing risk, corporate bonds, voluntary disclosure

JEL Classification: G11, G12. G50, Q51

Suggested Citation

Bassen, Alexander and Gibson, Rajna and Hoepner, Andreas G. F. and Klausmann, Johannes and Oikonomou, Ioannis, Do ESG Preferences Survive in the Trading Room? An Experimental Study (September 16, 2023). Michael J. Brennan Irish Finance Working Paper Series Research Paper No. 23-7, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4573619 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4573619

Alexander Bassen

University of Hamburg ( email )

Von-Melle-Park 5
20146 Hamburg
Germany

University of Reading - ICMA Centre ( email )

Whiteknights Park
P.O. Box 242
Reading RG6 6BA
United Kingdom

Rajna Gibson

University of Geneva - Geneva Finance Research Institute (GFRI) ( email )

40 Boulevard du Pont d'Arve
Geneva 4, Geneva 1211
Switzerland
+41.22.379.89.83 (Phone)

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Andreas G. F. Hoepner

Smurfit Graduate Business School, University College Dublin ( email )

Blackrock, Co. Dublin
Ireland

European Commission - DG FISMA ( email )

2 Rue de Spa
Brussels, 1000
Belgium

Johannes Klausmann

University of Virginia - Darden School of Business ( email )

P.O. Box 6550
Charlottesville, VA 22906-6550
United States

Ioannis Oikonomou (Contact Author)

University of Reading - ICMA Centre ( email )

Whiteknights Park
P.O. Box 242
Reading RG6 6BA
United Kingdom

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