Comments of Economists and Lawyers on the Draft Merger Guidelines

14 Pages Posted: 16 Oct 2023 Last revised: 11 Dec 2023

See all articles by Jonathan B. Baker

Jonathan B. Baker

American University - Washington College of Law

Andrew I. Gavil

Howard University School of Law

Richard Gilbert

University of California, Berkeley

Herbert Hovenkamp

University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School; University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School

Michael L. Katz

University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics; Haas School of Business

A. Douglas Melamed

Stanford Law School

Fiona M. Scott Morton

Yale School of Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Daniel L. Rubinfeld

University of California at Berkeley - School of Law; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); New York University (NYU) - Center for Law and Business

Carl Shapiro

University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business

Howard A. Shelanski

Georgetown University Law Center

Date Written: September 18, 2023

Abstract

These comments on the DOJ and FTC draft merger guidelines were submitted on Sept. 15, 2023.

We are concerned, however, about aspects of the draft guidelines that could be read to interfere with their ability to implement our shared objective effectively, by making it more difficult for enforcers to rely on economic analysis to discriminate between mergers that risk harming competition and those that do not. Such an approach to merger enforcement would limit the influence of the dMGs and potentially undermine their capacity to benefit buyers and suppliers in the affected markets, foster economic growth, and lessen inequality. The comments below explain these concerns more fully.

Keywords: Merger Guidelines, antitrust

JEL Classification: K21, L44

Suggested Citation

Baker, Jonathan B. and Gavil, Andrew I. and Gilbert, Richard and Hovenkamp, Herbert and Katz, Michael L. and Melamed, Doug and Scott Morton, Fiona M. and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. and Shapiro, Carl and Shelanski, Howard A., Comments of Economists and Lawyers on the Draft Merger Guidelines (September 18, 2023). U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 23-45, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4574947 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4574947

Jonathan B. Baker (Contact Author)

American University - Washington College of Law ( email )

4300 Nebraska Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20016
United States
202-274-4315 (Phone)

Andrew I. Gavil

Howard University School of Law ( email )

2900 Van Ness St., N.W.
Washington, DC 20008
United States
202-806-8018 (Phone)
202-806-8567 (Fax)

Richard Gilbert

University of California, Berkeley ( email )

Department of Economics
530 Evans Hall #3880
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
510 339 6493 (Phone)

Herbert Hovenkamp

University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School ( email )

3501 Sansom Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
319-512-9579 (Phone)

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School ( email )

3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6365
United States

Michael L. Katz

University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics ( email )

579 Evans Hall
Berkeley, CA 94709
United States

Haas School of Business ( email )

Berkeley, CA 94720
United States

Doug Melamed

Stanford Law School ( email )

559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States

Fiona M. Scott Morton

Yale School of Management ( email )

493 College St
New Haven, CT CT 06520
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Daniel L. Rubinfeld

University of California at Berkeley - School of Law ( email )

215 Law Building
Berkeley, CA 94720-7200
United States
(510) 642-1959 (Phone)
(510) 642-3767 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.berkeley.edu/faculty/rubinfeldd

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

New York University (NYU) - Center for Law and Business ( email )

44 West Fourth Street, Suite 9-53
New York, NY 10012-1126
United States
(212) 992 8834 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://rb.gy/1voeui

Carl Shapiro

University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business ( email )

545 Student Services Building, #1900
2220 Piedmont Avenue
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
510-642-5905 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu

Howard A. Shelanski

Georgetown University Law Center ( email )

600 New Jersey Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001
United States

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