Information Acquisition and Decision Making in Committees: A Survey
55 Pages Posted: 26 Jan 2004
Date Written: September 2003
Abstract
This is a survey on the recent game theoretic literature on committee decision making. We consider theoretical work on the role of (i) strategic voting, (ii) costly information acquisition, (iii) conflicting interests, and (iv) communication in committees. Moreover, we review recent experimental evidence on these issues. Our analysis focuses on the optimal size, composition, and decision rules of committees. We discuss implications for the design of monetary policy committees.
Keywords: Committees, strategic voting, costly information acquisition, monetary policy committees
JEL Classification: D71, E52
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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