Information Acquisition and Decision Making in Committees: A Survey

55 Pages Posted: 26 Jan 2004

See all articles by Kerstin Gerling

Kerstin Gerling

International Monetary Fund (IMF)

H. P. Gruner

University of Mannheim - Department of Economics; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Alexandra Kiel

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Elisabeth Schulte

University of Mannheim - Department of Economics

Date Written: September 2003

Abstract

This is a survey on the recent game theoretic literature on committee decision making. We consider theoretical work on the role of (i) strategic voting, (ii) costly information acquisition, (iii) conflicting interests, and (iv) communication in committees. Moreover, we review recent experimental evidence on these issues. Our analysis focuses on the optimal size, composition, and decision rules of committees. We discuss implications for the design of monetary policy committees.

Keywords: Committees, strategic voting, costly information acquisition, monetary policy committees

JEL Classification: D71, E52

Suggested Citation

Gerling, Kerstin and Grüner, Hans Peter and Kiel, Alexandra and Schulte, Elisabeth, Information Acquisition and Decision Making in Committees: A Survey (September 2003). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=457524

Kerstin Gerling (Contact Author)

International Monetary Fund (IMF) ( email )

Hans Peter Grüner

University of Mannheim - Department of Economics ( email )

D-68131 Mannheim
Germany

Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Alexandra Kiel

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Elisabeth Schulte

University of Mannheim - Department of Economics ( email )

D-68131 Mannheim
Germany

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