Deceptive Choice Architecture and Behavioural Audits

31 Pages Posted: 13 Oct 2023 Last revised: 17 Oct 2023

See all articles by Stuart Mills

Stuart Mills

Department of Economics, University of Leeds; London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Psychological and Behavioural Science

Date Written: October 16, 2023

Abstract

Regulators are increasingly concerned about deceptive choice architecture in private markets. Such deceptive practices include behavioural sludge and dark patterns. Fostering a regulatory environment which reduces the harms caused by these behavioural designs, while safeguarding the benefits of well-meaning behavioural insights, is essential. I argue a principles-based regulatory approach will be key to provide flexibility given subjective experiences of choice architecture. Furthermore, I suggest behavioural audits could support a positive regulatory environment, maintaining the benefits of behavioural insights while safeguarding citizens and consumers. Some initial proposals for such audits are offered.

Keywords: Choice Architecture, Regulation, Principles-Based Regulation, Behavioural Audits, AI

JEL Classification: M38, M48

Suggested Citation

Mills, Stuart, Deceptive Choice Architecture and Behavioural Audits (October 16, 2023). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4575923 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4575923

Stuart Mills (Contact Author)

Department of Economics, University of Leeds ( email )

Leeds, LS2 9JT
United Kingdom

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Psychological and Behavioural Science ( email )

(PBS), 3rd Floor, Queens House
55/56 Lincoln's Inn Field
London, WC2A 3LJ
United Kingdom

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