Decoding GPT’s Hidden ‘Rationality’ of Cooperation

34 Pages Posted: 19 Sep 2023

See all articles by Kevin Bauer

Kevin Bauer

University of Mannheim; Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE

Lena Liebich

Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE

Oliver Hinz

Goethe University Frankfurt - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration

Michael Kosfeld

Goethe University Frankfurt; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); University of Bonn - Center for Development Research (ZEF)

Date Written: September 19, 2023

Abstract

In current discussions on large language models (LLMs) such as GPT, understanding their ability to emulate facets of human intelligence stands central. Using behavioral economic paradigms and structural models, we investigate GPT’s cooperativeness in human interactions and assess its rational goal-oriented behavior. We discover that GPT cooperates more than humans and has overly optimistic expectations about human cooperation. Intriguingly, additional analyses reveal that GPT’s behavior isn’t random; it displays a level of goal-oriented rationality surpassing human counterparts. Our findings suggest that GPT hyper-rationally aims to maximize social welfare, coupled with a strive of self-preservation. Methodologically, our esearch highlights how structural models, typically employed to decipher human behavior, can illuminate the rationality and goal-orientation of LLMs. This opens a compelling path for future research into the intricate rationality of sophisticated, yet enigmatic artificial agents.

Keywords: large language models, cooperation, goal orientation, economic rationality

Suggested Citation

Bauer, Kevin and Liebich, Lena and Hinz, Oliver and Kosfeld, Michael, Decoding GPT’s Hidden ‘Rationality’ of Cooperation (September 19, 2023). SAFE Working Paper No. 401, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4576036 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4576036

Kevin Bauer (Contact Author)

University of Mannheim ( email )

L15
1-6
Mannheim, 68131
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.bwl.uni-mannheim.de/bauer/

Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE ( email )

(http://www.safe-frankfurt.de)
Theodor-W.-Adorno-Platz 3
Frankfurt am Main, 60323
Germany

Lena Liebich

Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE ( email )

(http://www.safe-frankfurt.de)
Theodor-W.-Adorno-Platz 3
Frankfurt am Main, 60323
Germany

Oliver Hinz

Goethe University Frankfurt - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration ( email )

Mertonstrasse 17-25
Frankfurt am Main, D-60325
Germany

Michael Kosfeld

Goethe University Frankfurt ( email )

Faculty of Economics and Business Administration
Theodor-W.-Adorno-Platz 4
Frankfurt am Main, 60323
Germany

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Schaumburg-Lippe-Str. 7 / 9
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

University of Bonn - Center for Development Research (ZEF) ( email )

Walter-Flex-Str. 3
Bonn, NRW 53113
Germany

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