Suppressing Resistance to Low-Skill Migration

INTERNATIONAL TAX AND PUBLIC FINANCE, Vol. 3, No. 3, Special Issue

Posted: 21 Jan 1997

See all articles by Assaf Razin

Assaf Razin

Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Efraim Sadka

Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Abstract

Just like any other trade activity, migration tends to generate gains to all parties involved, the migrants as well as the native population, if markets are well-functioning. But typically these gains tend to be rather low. However, when the labor market is malfunctioning, migration may exacerbate the imperfections in the market. Consequently, it could lead to losses to the host-country population, which can be quite sizable. An additional problem raised by migration is the toll it imposes on the welfare state. As a democracy, the host-country cannot exclude migrants from various entitlement programs and public services. As a consequence, the modern welfare state could find it more and more costly to run its various programs when they attract low-income migrants. These considerations may help explain why there is strong resistance to migration. Consequently, to be able to benefit from migration, one may want to improve the functioning of the markets (with a compensation to wage earners that compete with unskilled migrants) and to downsize the scope of the state entitlement programs.

JEL Classification: O15, H53, J31, J61

Suggested Citation

Razin, Assaf and Sadka, Efraim, Suppressing Resistance to Low-Skill Migration. INTERNATIONAL TAX AND PUBLIC FINANCE, Vol. 3, No. 3, Special Issue. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4577

Assaf Razin (Contact Author)

Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 39040
Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv, 69978
Israel
+972 3 640 7303 (Phone)
+972 3 640 9908 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Efraim Sadka

Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 39040
Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv, 69978
Israel
+972 3 640 9712 (Phone)
+972 3 642 8074 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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