Strategic Disclosure in Research Races

52 Pages Posted: 16 Oct 2023

See all articles by Kalyan Chatterjee

Kalyan Chatterjee

The Pennsylvania State University

Kaustav Das

University of Leicester

Miaomiao Dong

Pennsylvania State University, Department of Economics

Date Written: August 20, 2023

Abstract

We study a research race between two players. Each player works on an identical two-step project. To work on step 2, a player must complete step 1. Each step is completed with a discovery. Once a discovery is made, a player decides whether and when to disclose it. Disclosure of an intermediate discovery gives an immediate reward to the player, but it also allows the opponent to copy it and compete for a final reward from the final discovery. We show that a higher final reward has a U-shaped effect on when the intermediate finding is disclosed and when the final finding is discovered: A higher final reward speeds up both if and only if the final reward is low.

Keywords: Research races, strategic disclosure

JEL Classification: D83, O31

Suggested Citation

Chatterjee, Kalyan and Das, Kaustav and Dong, Miaomiao, Strategic Disclosure in Research Races (August 20, 2023). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4577033 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4577033

Kalyan Chatterjee

The Pennsylvania State University ( email )

Dept. of Economics
University Park, PA 16802
United States
814-865-6050 (Phone)
866-716-1527 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://kalyanchatterjee.weebly.com

Kaustav Das

University of Leicester ( email )

University Road
Leicester, LE1 7RH
United Kingdom

Miaomiao Dong (Contact Author)

Pennsylvania State University, Department of Economics ( email )

University Park, PA
United States

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