Preferences for Government Regulation of Pensions: What I Want for Myself and What I Want for Others

39 Pages Posted: 20 Sep 2023 Last revised: 5 Aug 2024

See all articles by Carmen Sainz Villalba

Carmen Sainz Villalba

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance

Kai A. Konrad

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Date Written: September 20, 2023

Abstract

This paper analyzes how financial literacy and the perception of own eccentricity in pension preferences relates to citizens' desire to make own choices or to delegate these to the government. It also considers how these factors relate to what regulation citizens want for their co-citizens, and to what extent the regulation they want for themselves relates to the regulation they want for others. We find that respondents with more financial knowledge want less government regulation. Furthermore, those that perceive themselves as having different preferences than the average population want less government regulation. The amount of regulation that respondents want for themselves is highly correlated with what they want for others. However, some respondents hold different preferences for themselves than for others. Specifically, those that want less government regulation for themselves and have more financial knowledge want, on average, more government intervention for others.

Keywords: Pensions, savings, pension regulation, paternalism, Autonomy, Delegation, Financial Literacy, Knowledge, Eccentricity JEL Codes: D78, D03

JEL Classification: D63, G28, H11, H55

Suggested Citation

Sainz Villalba, Carmen and Konrad, Kai A.,
Preferences for Government Regulation of Pensions: What I Want for Myself and What I Want for Others
(September 20, 2023). Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2023 - 10, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4577578 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4577578

Carmen Sainz Villalba (Contact Author)

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
München, 80539
Germany

Kai A. Konrad

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, 80539
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.tax.mpg.de/en/pub/home.cfm

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CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

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IZA Institute of Labor Economics

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