Merger Control in Japan: "In Informal Remedies We Trust"

The University of Tokyo Law Review, Vol. 18 (December 2023), 172-188, http://www.sllr.j.u-tokyo.ac.jp/18/papers/LR18_vandewalle.pdf

17 Pages Posted: 27 Oct 2023 Last revised: 7 Jun 2024

See all articles by Simon Vande Walle

Simon Vande Walle

University of Tokyo - Graduate Schools for Law and Politics

Date Written: September 20, 2023

Abstract

This article aims to shed light on Japan’s experience with merger remedies, i.e. the measures which companies take to obtain the Japan Fair Trade Commission’s approval of a deal that would otherwise harm competition. Japan’s system of ex ante merger control is the oldest in the world and remedies have played a key role in the system. Remarkably, the Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) has never prohibited a merger and the system has now functioned for more than seventy years without any court intervention. The process through which remedies are negotiated and approved is informal and operates based on guidelines issued by the JFTC. This article argues that, although the system seems to grant the JFTC significant power and discretion, the JFTC has not used this power to extract far-reaching remedies. Instead, from the viewpoint of the companies involved, it has shown restraint and been pragmatic rather than principled. <br> 
The published version of this paper is available for free at http://www.sllr.j.u-tokyo.ac.jp/18/papers/LR18_vandewalle.pdf <br> 
Citation: Simon Vande Walle, <i>Merger Control in Japan: "In Informal Remedies We Trust",</i> <span>18 University of Tokyo Law Review</span> 172-188 (2023). <br>

Keywords: antitrust, competition law, merger control, Japan, remedies

JEL Classification: K21

Suggested Citation

Vande Walle, Simon, Merger Control in Japan: "In Informal Remedies We Trust" (September 20, 2023). The University of Tokyo Law Review, Vol. 18 (December 2023), 172-188, http://www.sllr.j.u-tokyo.ac.jp/18/papers/LR18_vandewalle.pdf, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4577620 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4577620

Simon Vande Walle (Contact Author)

University of Tokyo - Graduate Schools for Law and Politics ( email )

7-3-1 Hongo Bunkyo-Ku
Tokyo, 113-0033
Japan

HOME PAGE: http://www.simonvandewalle.eu

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