Escaping Non-Compete Agreements: The Role of Social Connections

60 Pages Posted: 27 Oct 2023 Last revised: 18 Apr 2025

See all articles by Jason (Pang-Li) Chen

Jason (Pang-Li) Chen

Harbert College of Business, Auburn University

Melissa Crumling

Drexel University

Torin McFarland

Drexel University - Department of Finance

Date Written: September 26, 2023

Abstract

This paper shows that social ties propagate the effects of stricter non-compete agreement (NCA) enforcement across geographic boundaries. While existing studies emphasize negative local impacts of strengthened NCA enforcement, such as decreased labor mobility, reduced wages, and lower innovation output, we explore interstate spillover effects facilitated by inventors' social networks. Using inventor-level data and the Social Connectedness Index developed from Facebook friendship links, we demonstrate that inventors respond to tighter NCA policies by relocating to distant counties where they have strong social ties. Moreover, we find that out-of-state regions with high social proximity to inventors from states with strengthened NCA enforcement experience a 7% growth in both inventor populations and innovation output, measured by increased patent counts and citations. These spillover benefits particularly accrue to young and private firms and result in increased entrepreneurial activity, as measured by new firm formation and venture capital funding. Combined, these findings are consistent with social ties alleviating informational frictions and enhancing labor market matching efficiency. Overall, our findings highlight the importance of social ties in generating cross-regional spillovers when implementing labor mobility policies.

Keywords: Labor Mobility, Inventor Productivity, Corporate Innovation, Entrepreneurship, Regulation, Non-compete Agreements, Patents

JEL Classification: E24, G18, G32, G38, O31

Suggested Citation

Chen, Jason (Pang-Li) and Crumling, Melissa and McFarland, Torin,
Escaping Non-Compete Agreements: The Role of Social Connections
(September 26, 2023). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4584780 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4584780

Jason (Pang-Li) Chen (Contact Author)

Harbert College of Business, Auburn University ( email )

Auburn, AL 36849
United States

Melissa Crumling

Drexel University ( email )

3141 Chestnut St
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States

Torin McFarland

Drexel University - Department of Finance ( email )

3220 Market Street
Office 1133
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.torinmcfarland.com

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