Shareholder Wealth Maximization and Securities Fraud

19 Pages Posted: 28 Sep 2023 Last revised: 3 Oct 2023

See all articles by James J. Park

James J. Park

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - School of Law

Date Written: September 27, 2023


Government enforcers are often criticized for not identifying and prosecuting individual executives responsible for corporate misconduct. This essay contends that the failure to bring enforcement actions against individuals can be partly explained by the difficulty of disentangling individual and corporate incentives for wrongful corporate acts. For example, in securities fraud cases, it can be challenging to determine whether corporate managers issued a materially misleading disclosure to further shareholder wealth or to enrich themselves. Enforcers are less likely to pursue individuals in the corporate context without a clear agency costs story.

Keywords: Securities, Securities Regulation, Securities Law, Securities Fraud, Corporate Law, Corporate Governance, Corporate Purpose, Corporate Responsibility, Shareholder Wealth Maximization

Suggested Citation

Park, James J., Shareholder Wealth Maximization and Securities Fraud (September 27, 2023). DePaul Law Review, Vol. 72, No. 10, 2023, UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 23-07, Available at SSRN:

James J. Park (Contact Author)

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - School of Law ( email )

385 Charles E. Young Dr. East
Room 1242
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1476
United States

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