The Economics of Tort Law: A Precis

THE ELGAR COMPANION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS (2nd ed.), Edward Elgar Publishing, 2006

George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 03-49

27 Pages Posted: 16 Oct 2003

See all articles by Giuseppe Dari‐Mattiacci

Giuseppe Dari‐Mattiacci

Columbia University - Law School

Francesco Parisi

University of Minnesota - Law School; University of Bologna

Abstract

Economic analysis has long been employed for the study of tort liability. This paper revisits the main contributions to the subject emphasizing the inherent impossibility for tort liability to set perfectly efficient first-best incentives to take precaution for all parties to an accident and the need to choose among second best outcomes. The paper provides a pathfinder through the literature in various areas of tort law and economics.

Suggested Citation

Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe and Parisi, Francesco, The Economics of Tort Law: A Precis. THE ELGAR COMPANION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS (2nd ed.), Edward Elgar Publishing, 2006; George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 03-49. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=458701 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.458701

Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci

Columbia University - Law School ( email )

435 West 116th Street
New York, NY 10025
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.law.columbia.edu/faculty/giuseppe-dari-mattiacci

Francesco Parisi (Contact Author)

University of Minnesota - Law School ( email )

229 19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States

University of Bologna ( email )

Piazza Scaravilli 1
40126 Bologna, fc 47100
Italy

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