THE ELGAR COMPANION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS (2nd ed.), Edward Elgar Publishing, 2006
27 Pages Posted: 16 Oct 2003
Economic analysis has long been employed for the study of tort liability. This paper revisits the main contributions to the subject emphasizing the inherent impossibility for tort liability to set perfectly efficient first-best incentives to take precaution for all parties to an accident and the need to choose among second best outcomes. The paper provides a pathfinder through the literature in various areas of tort law and economics.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Dari‐Mattiacci, Giuseppe and Parisi, Francesco, The Economics of Tort Law: A Precis. THE ELGAR COMPANION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS (2nd ed.), Edward Elgar Publishing, 2006; George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 03-49. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=458701 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.458701