Lender Learning and the Public Equity Market

50 Pages Posted: 19 Oct 2023 Last revised: 5 Dec 2023

See all articles by Emmanuel T. De George

Emmanuel T. De George

University of Miami

John Donovan

University of Notre Dame - Department of Accountancy

Matthew Phillips

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management

Regina Wittenberg Moerman

University of Southern California

Date Written: October 3, 2023

Abstract

We examine whether private lenders learn from the equity market. We conjecture that lenders can learn new information from stock prices about firms’ fundamentals and growth opportunities (prospects channel) or managers’ incentives to take risky actions that may be detrimental to the value of debt claims (incentives channel). Exploiting the mergers and acquisitions (M&A) setting, we find a V-shaped relation between M&A announcement returns and the interest spread on loans issued following M&As. We further show that the association between announcement returns and the interest spread is more pronounced when managers’ risk-taking incentives are likely to be more acute. These findings suggest that lenders learn from stock prices in assessing borrowers’ creditworthiness and that this learning works, at least partially, through the incentives channel. Our evidence highlights a novel channel through which firm stakeholders with incentives misaligned with those of stockholders can learn from stock returns.

Suggested Citation

De George, Emmanuel T. and Donovan, John and Phillips, Matthew and Wittenberg Moerman, Regina, Lender Learning and the Public Equity Market (October 3, 2023). University of Miami Business School Research Paper No. 4591443, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4591443 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4591443

Emmanuel T. De George

University of Miami ( email )

Coral Gables, FL 33146-6531
United States
305-284-2273 (Phone)

John Donovan

University of Notre Dame - Department of Accountancy ( email )

Mendoza College of Business
Notre Dame, IN 46556-5646
United States

Matthew Phillips

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )

100 Main Street
E62-416
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States

Regina Wittenberg Moerman (Contact Author)

University of Southern California ( email )

2250 Alcazar Street
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States

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