Telecommunications Policies: Determinants and Impact

IESE Working Paper No. D/510

27 Pages Posted: 26 Nov 2003

See all articles by Jordi Gual

Jordi Gual

University of Navarra - IESE Business School; la Caixa; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Francesc Trillas

Autonomous University of Barcelona - Department of Economics; University of Navarra - IESE Business School

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: July 2003

Abstract

This paper presents new data, in the form of four indices, on liberalization policies and the independence of regulators for a cross-section of countries. These indices are combined with a comprehensive set of performance, institutional and political data to analyze both the determinants and the impact of telecommunications policies. The authors find that liberalization policies are negatively associated with the degree to which countries have an interventionist tradition, but not with the partisan ideology of reforming countries per se. They also find that countries where the institutional endowment constrains less the behavior of the executive bodies, and countries with a stronger incumbent, are more prone to create truly independent regulatory agencies. There is weak evidence that the creation of independent regulatory agencies has a positive effect on network penetration when the endogeneity of regulatory independence is taken into account.

Keywords: telecommunications, liberalization, institutions

JEL Classification: L96, L32, F21

Suggested Citation

Gual, Jordi and Trillas Jané, Francesc, Telecommunications Policies: Determinants and Impact (July 2003). IESE Working Paper No. D/510. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=459220 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.459220

Jordi Gual

University of Navarra - IESE Business School ( email )

Avenida Pearson 21
Barcelona, 08034
Spain
+34 3 253 4200 (Phone)
+34 3 253 4343 (Fax)

la Caixa ( email )

Av Diagonal 629
Barcelona, 08028
Spain

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Francesc Trillas Jané (Contact Author)

Autonomous University of Barcelona - Department of Economics ( email )

Avda. Diagonal 690
Barcelona, 08034
Spain

University of Navarra - IESE Business School

Avenida Pearson 21
Barcelona, 08034
Spain

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